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L Introduction
The Roosevelt Court and the Rehnquist Court, separated by halfa century,
share a reputation for producing splintered decisions with strong concurrences
and dissents by individualistic Justices. The members of the Roosevelt Court
were the trailblazers, rejecting a long-established tradition that favored consen-
* Professor of Law and H. Albert Young Fellow in Constitutional Law, Widener Uni-
versity School of Law. Ph.D., J.D., Yale University, NB. Bryn Mawr College. I am grateful
to Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Alan Garfield, Philip Ray, and Florence Wagman Roisman for their
helpful readings of earlier drafts of this Article.
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sus opinions with limited disagreement and adopting instead a mode of de-
cisionmaking that favored separate opinions by dissident Justices. Although
subsequent Courts followed the Roosevelt Court model, it is the Rehnquist
Court that has made separate opinions the hallmark of its practice. Linda
Greenhouse's recent review of the Court's 2000 Term was aptly headlined The
High Court and the Triumph of Discord.I
The transformation ofthe Court's jurisprudential tradition from consensus
to discord has been accompanied by a shift in focus from the Court as a unitary
institution to the Court as an assemblage of distinctive individuals. Just as they
challenged the idea of decisionmaking by consensus, the Roosevelt Court
Justices also challenged the norm of impersonal judicial prose. The leaders of
the Court wrote their opinions in distinctive styles, from Felix Frankfirter's
academic density to Robert Jackson's tart elegance and Hugo Black's home-
spun simplicity, that personalized their jurisprudence. As law clerks came to
dominate the opinion writing practices of the Court, however, many Justices'
opinions, even dissents and concurrences, took on the bland 'and featureless
style of law review prose. On the Rehnquist Court only Antonin Scalia writes
in an immediately recognizable style, but his colleagues have found other ways
to personalize their opinions, sometimes by allowing powerful emotional
responses to appear through their otherwise neutral prose.
Court opinions personalized by style, content, or both, enliven the often
dreary pages of the US. Reports, but they also raise difficult questions about
the role of judicial personality in the decisionnaking process. In his influential
essay Reason, Passion, and "The Progress of the Law," Justice Brennan chal-
lenged the idea that judges should speak only in the impersonal tones of a
detached and dispassionate professional.2 Returning to Justice Cardozo's
classic work The Nature of the Judicial Process,3 Brennan agreed with Car-
dozo that such impersonality is not possible and that judges inevitably infuse
their work with elements of their own distinctive natures.4 Recognizing this,
Brennan argued that we should acknowledge that '"tis internal dialogue of
reason and passion" is essential to the "vitality" of the decisionmaking pro-
cess.5 Although Cardozo also had recognized the effect of a judge's individ-
ual nature on the judicial process, he was less enthusiastic than Brennan.
Cardozo regretted that "[tihe great tides and currents which engulf the rest of
1. Linda Greenhouse, The High Court and the Triumph of Discord, N.Y. TIMES, July
15,2001, at § 4, p. 1.
2. William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and 'The Progress of the Law," 10 CAR-
DOW L. REV. 3 (1988).
3. BENWAMINN. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
4. Brennan, supra note 2, at 3 (stating thesis that "internal dialogue of reason and passion,
does not taint the judicial process, but is in fact central to its vitality").
5. Brennan, supra note 2, at 3.
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men do not turn aside in their course and pass the judges by"6 and affirmed a
judicial responsibility to resist those subjective currents in favor of broader
community standards. Like Brennan, though, he conceded that the myth of
pure judicial impersonality was an "ideal ... beyond the reach of human
faculties to attain."7
To acknowledge with Cardozo or to celebrate with Brennan the idea that
the judge's individual nature is part of the judicial process is to suggest the
related idea that even formal judicial prose can convey the personality of its
author. The Justices of the Roosevelt and Rehnquist Courts illustrate this idea
with the use of a variety of rhetorical strategies to contain their personal
responses to the cases before them. An examination of the prose styles of four
prominent Roosevelt Court Justices reveals the diverse ways in which judicial
personality can assert itself and, at the same time, serve to express the author's
jurisprudential vision. Their counterparts on the Rehnquist Court reveal their
personal reactions in more oblique and complicated ways, but they too illus-
trate Cardozo's insight that even stylistic discipline and platoons of law clerks
cannot extinguish the spark of personality from the work of Justices who draw
on emotion and experience, as well as intellect, in shaping their judicial
responses.
ff. The Roosevelt Court Quartet: Four Judicial Voices
A. Finding a Voice
The formalist legal tradition, in which judicial decisions were said to be
determined by the neutral forces of reason and logic, left little room for
personalized opinions. Nineteenth century Supreme Court opinions reflect
this tradition, and in an era when law clerks had not yet assumed a ghost-
writing role, the Justices' opinions nonetheless display a uniformity that large-
ly conceals the stamp of personality. In the early decades of the twentieth
century, two of the Court's greatest stylists, Justices Holmes and Cardozo,
transformed the bland Court landscape with their distinctive prose - Holmes's
concise, lucid, and epigrammatic opinions" and Cardozo's elegant literary com-
positions.9 Because Cardozo succeeded to Holmes's seat, however, the two
6. CARDOZO, supra note 3, at 168.
7. Id. at 169. The relation of a judge's personal beliefs to his or her jurisprudence was
also linked to the more complex Legal Realist movement of the 1920s and 1930s, especially by
its critics who "often caricatured [the Realist credo] as the proposition that how a judge decides
a case on a given day depends primarily on what he or she had for breakfast." AMERICAN LEGAL
REAi=4 xiv (William W. Fisher II, Morton J. Horwitz, & Thomas A. Reed eds., 1996).
8. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Introduction, THE ESSENTIAL HOiMES xiii-iv, xvi-xvii
(1992) (discussing Holmes's literary qualities).
9. For a balanced discussion of Cardozo's style, see ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO
447-51 (1998). For a warmer appreciation, see Louis AUCEiINCLOSS, The Styles ofMr. Justice
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never wrote for the same Court, and their opinions never offered readers com-
peting treatments of the same legal problem.
The Roosevelt Court, however, changed the tone of the Court. President
Franklin Roosevelt's appointments included four of the most intellectually
talented, ambitious, and self-assured men ever to occupy the bench: Hugo
Black, Felix Frankfurter, William 0. Douglas, and Robert Jackson. They
continued to occupy it, in varying combinations, for an overlapping period of
over thirty years, from 1939, when Frankfurter and Douglas joined Black,
until 1971, when Black's resignation left Douglas as the last survivor. These
Justices, whose alliances and antagonisms have become the stuff of Court
legend,"0 wrote their opinions in a spirit of conviction sharpened by competi-
tion for the votes of their more malleable colleagues and for the attention of
the political and academic observers who followed the Court. Their terms of
service covered a broad swath of American history, from the New Deal and
World War H through the civil rights movement and the social revolution of
the 1960s. And their opinions replaced the uniform and sober certainties of
an earlier generation of Justices with a variety of assertive styles that broke
with tradition in their eagerness to communicate, to persuade, and to triumph.
This new approach to opinion writing is identifiable in both form and
manner. As scholars have amply documented, the incidence of concurrences
and dissents exploded during the Roosevelt Court, whose members were the
first to normalize the practice of writing separately to distinguish or qualify
their opinions or to reject the opinions of their colleagues." The author of a
concurrence or dissent was freed from the obligation to win votes by accom-
modating the preferences and reservations of his colleagues. These Roosevelt
Court Justices appreciated this freedom and applied different standards to
their separate opinions. They might share, up to a point, Black's belief that
a majority opinion could never be eloquent,12 but they felt entitled in their
concurrences and dissents to stamp their work with a personal style.
Cardozo, in LIFE, LAW AND LETTERS 47 (1979). Cardozo himself wrote an essay on the literary
qualities of judicial opinions, which Auchincloss applied to Cardozo's own style. Benjamin
Cardozo, Law and Literature, LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 3
(1931); see Jerome Frank (writing anonymously), The Speech ofJudges: A Dissenting Opinion,
29 VA. L. REV. 625,629-39 (1943) (providing strong critique of Cardozo's style).
10. See generally JANES F. SIMON, THE ANTAGONISTS: HUGO BLACK, FELIX FANK-
FURTER AND CIVIL LmnTmS IN MODERN AMERICA (1989) (analyzing friction between Black
and Frankfurter); MELVIN I. UROFSKY, DIVION AND DISCORD: THE SuPREMIM COURT UNDER
STONE AND VINSON, 1941-1953 (1997) (providing broader study of internal disagreements on
Stone and Vinson Courts).
11. See C. HERMANPRrrCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: ASTUDYIN JUDICIALPOLITICS
AND VALUSS 1937-1947, at 23-45 (1963) (analyzing incidence of dissent).
12. ROo NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK 417 (1994).
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As a consequence, their opinions often speak in a distinctive voice that
replaces bland legal prose with a range of rhetorical strategies calculated to
persuade the reader. All four Roosevelt Court Justices were accomplished
oralists, whether as courtroom advocate, political speaker, teacher, or conver-
sationalist. All had experience using the force of their strong personalities to
persuade others, and their opinions capture those personalities within the con-
straints of legal prose. The voices that emanate from their opinions are recog-
nizable - a reader would be unlikely to confuse Black with Frankfurter,
Douglas with Jackson, or even Black with Douglas. An examination of se-
lected opinions suggests both how these voices were constructed and what they
tell us about their creators.
B. The Quartet Speaks
The Roosevelt Court Justices came to the bench from extraordinarily
diverse backgrounds: Black, a United States senator from rural Alabama
who graduated from the University of Alabama Law School but never earned
an undergraduate degree;13 Frankfurter, a Harvard Law School professor who
arrived in New York City as a non-English speaking Austrian immigrant at
the age of twelve, received an undergraduate degree from City College, and
graduated first in his class from Harvard Law School;14 Douglas, a Yale Law
School professor and a commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission who suffered from polio during his impoverished boyhood in
Washington before distinguishing himself at Whitman College and Columbia
Law School; and Jackson, Franklin Roosevelt's solicitor general and
attorney general, a country lawyer from upstate New York who entered legal
practice with neither a college nor a law school degree. 6 The academic
credentials of these four Justices reflect a transitional period in American
legal education during which it was not uncommon to enroll in law school
without a bachelor's degree, as Black did," or to study law as an apprentice
without any academic degrees, as Jackson did.18 It was also possible,
although not usual, for intellectually gifted young men without any financial
13. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT 72 (Kermit L. Hall ed.,
1992) [hereinafter OXFORD COMPANION]; THE SUPREME COURT A TO Z 39-40 (Elder Witt ed.,
1994).
14. OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 13, at 314-16.
15. Id. at 233.
16. Id. at 443.
17. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGALEDUCAIONINAMERICAFROMTHE 1950S TO
THE 1980s 36 (1983).
18. In 1927, no state required law school education for admission to the bar. Id. at 174.
Jackson was a student at Albany Law School where he completed the two-year law program in
one year. THE SUPREME COURT A TO Z, supra note 13, at 208.
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resources to attend the nation's most prestigious law schools, as Frankfurter
and Douglas did. 9
We might expect these variations in background and educational prepara-
tion to be reflected in the legal voices of these Justices, and in fact they are,
though not in the most predictable way. Frankfurter, for whom English was
not his native language, wrote the most formal and elaborate prose of the four.
Jackson, with the slenderest formal education, wrote the most artful and
allusive. Both Black and Douglas developed a plain style, although Black's
simplicity was the result of careful study while Douglas's was often the result
of rapid composition. Even without substantive clues to the author's identity,
an opinion, particularly one of concurrence or dissent, may carry the mark of
its maker in more subtle ways. For these Justices, all strong personalities with
diverse experiences and accomplishments, the legal voice is an agent of calcu-
lated self-revelation.
1. Justice Black: The People's Justice
The voice that speaks through Hugo Black's opinions is clear and straight-
forward. According to Roger Newman, his biographer, Black believed that
"' [wiriting in language that people cannot understand is one of the judicial sins
of our times. '20 His strong preference for simple diction and uncomplicated
syntax was a sophisticated choice; when Earl Warren, new to the Court, asked
Black to recommend a book on opinion writing, Black suggested the "'one
book which is far better than anything published before or after,"' Aristotle on
Rhetoric.2' As a self-conscious stylist, Black wanted his prose to be accessi-
ble to ordinary people because he wanted them to understand and appreciate
for themselves the legal protections the Constitution provided. In Black's
view, it was the Court's duty to respect and apply the unadorned words of the
Constitution.22 Just as he rejected judicial qualifications of constitutional
19. Frankfurter recalled that, after graduating from college, he worked for a year as a clerk
in the Tenement House Department of the City of New York to earn his law school tuition.
FEIX FRANKFUTR, Mix FRANKFuRTR REMINISCES 14-15 (Harlan B. Phillips ed., 1960).
At the time, Harvard's "tuition fee was $150 .... You could live on very little." Id. at 16.
Denied a loan or scholarship by Columbia Law School, Douglas found through its employment
office a job drafting a business law correspondence course and managed to earn his tuition
while attending law school. JAMES F. SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY: THE LIFE OF WIL.AM
0. DoUGLAs 64-65 (1980).
20. NEWMAN, supra note 12, at 325. According to Newman, "Black wanted litigants,
people in barber shops, 'your momma,' he once told a clerk, to understand his opinions." Id.
21. Id. at 427.
22. See, e.g., In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82,116 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) ("If we are
to pass on that great heritage of freedom, we must return to the original language of the Bill of
Rights. We must not be afraid to be free.").
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language that altered its original meaning, so he rejected complicated rhetoric
that prevented the Court from explaining the law directly to the people.
Black's chosen style, in other words, was directly linked to his jurisprudence.
A typical Black opinion has the cadences of spoken language, what
Newman calls '"he continuation of the oral tradition of the South."'  Black
often wrote by dictating his first drafts,24 and his separate opinions are filled
with rhetorical simulations of speech. One such device is the frequent use of
"I" or "me" to evoke immediacy. Dissenting in Betts v. Brady,25 for example,
Black posed the question of whether the defendant was denied a constitutional
right to counsel and answers in a brief sentence: "I think he was."'26 The con-
cluding sentence of the dissent combines a casual personal reference with
more formal legal diction: "Any other practice seems to me to defeat the
promise of our democratic society to provide equal justice under the law. ''27
The phrase "to me" is syntactically unnecessary, but stylistically it serves to
personalize an otherwise abstract formulation. Black also used conversational
diction to make his historical references less academic in tone. Thus, Ann
Hutchinson "was tried, iftrial it can be called," for her religious views, and on
the question of whether she was afforded a privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, the answer is a short and emphatic sentence: "Of course not."'  Black
even chose a metaphor to domesticate an historical point: he "cannot consider
the Bill of Rights to be an outworn 18th Century 'strait jacket.' 29 The
adjective "outworn" adds a homely touch to the deliberately sinister "strait
jacket," conveying in a vivid image Black's frequent theme of the Constitu-
tion's agelessness. In one of Black's most quoted passages, he has found a
simple but potent metaphor for the role of the courts as protectors of constitu-
tional rights for the dispossessed: The "courts stand against any winds that
blow as havens of refuge for those who might otherwise suffer."30
These rhetorical strategies dominate one of Black's most memorable
dissents, his rejection of the right to privacy identified by the majority in
Griswold v. Connecticut.3" The theme of the opinion is Black's refusal to
accept a new constitutional right, however attractive, that is not expressly
authorized by constitutional language. That point is made early in the opinion
23. NEWMAN, supra note 12, at 486.
24. Id.
25. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
26. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455,474 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 477 (Black, J., dissenting).
28. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,88 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 89 (Black, J., dissenting).
30. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,241 (1940).
31. 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
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in a sentence that carefully mixes colloquialism with more conventional
judicial language: "I like my privacy as well as the next one, but I am never-
theless compelled to admit that government has a right to invade it unless
prohibited by some specific constitutional provision." 2 The first part of the
sentence is conversational, even folksy, in its assertion of common ground
with a widespread human response; the second part raises the level of diction
to make the judge's technical point that this perfectly understandable taste for
privacy must still be supported by the language of the Constitution. The
remainder of the opinion is laced with similar contrasts of informal and
judicial diction. Black "get[s] nowhere in this case by talk about a constitu-
tional 'right of privacy' as an emanation from one or more constitutional pro-
visions,"33 rejecting as an illogical dead end Douglas's "penumbra" theory that
relies on shadowy emanations rather than firm constitutional language to
support the new right. Such clever -strategies, Black implied, are only disin-
genuous evasions that transfer policy-making power from the legislatures to
the courts by substituting vague standards for constitutional specifics. Thus,
he rejected "[tlhe use by federal courts of such a formula or doctrine or what-
not to veto federal or state laws, 34 with "whatnot" suggesting the frivolous
imprecision of the majority's approach. The lightly mocking tone is echoed
by his related observation that "the scientific miracles of this age have not yet
produced a gadget which the Court can use to determine what traditions are
rooted in the '[collective] conscience of our people. '05 The use of "gadget"
deliberately evokes mechanical trickery, again suggesting that any departure
from constitutional language is necessarily unreliable and unsound.
This last point derives from another major theme of Black's jurispru-
dence: his rejection of attempts by the Court 't o keep the Constitution in tune
with the times" by interpretation rather than by amendment. 36 Black sharpened
the contrast between these opposing views by describing his adversaries as
"good and able men [who] have eloquently spoken and written, sometimes in
rhapsodical strains," in support of their position. 37 He set against the well-
meaning rhapsodists his alliance with the framers of the Constitution who
required amendments ratified by the people: "That method of change was good
for our Fathers, and being somewhat old-fashioned I must add it is good
enough for me."3M The phrase "our Fathers" allies Black at once with his
readers and with the framers of the Constitution. To be "old-fashioned" in this
32. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 510 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 509-10 (Black, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 513 (Black, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 519 (Black, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 522 (Black, J., dissenting).
37. Id. (Black, J., dissenting
38. Id. (Black, J., dissenting).
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context is clearly to choose the historical bedrock of the Constitution over the
airy and unanchored views of the modernizers. The conversational tone of
Black's conclusion completes the contrast. His opinions speak not in "rhap-
sodical strains" but in the plain and well-grounded diction of a sensible man
who respects the wisdom of the past.
The voice that emerges from Black's opinions speaks to both legal and
lay readers with clarity and directness. Although Black was a voracious
reader of literature, history, and political theory, he wore his learning lightly,
and his opinions never overwhelm or condescend to the reader. They are a
rhetorical expression of his populist politics during his Senate career, and are
always mindful of the people whose lives will be affected by the Court's
decisions. Black's reverence for the text of the Constitution made him highly
sensitive to the nuances of language. His diction is a deliberate blend of the
folksy and the formal, and at its best his prose retains the cadences of spoken
language. Like the successful trial lawyer he was before entering politics,
Black tailored his voice to persuade his chosen audience, not just his col-
leagues on the bench or the legal profession, but the wider community as well.
He continued to believe, as he was taught by a professor of English, "that the
best way to tell any story is to tell it as simply as possible, in the simplest
words possible, and in the shortest way possible."39 Translated into the
specialized realm of opinion writing, that meant an economical opinion that
attempted to persuade ("[t]hat's why I put rhetoric in my opinions," Black
said) by speaking directly to the reader as much as possible in the diction and
syntax of intelligent conversation.'
2. Justice Frankfurter: The Democratic Elitist
If Black wanted his opinions to speak to a broad readership, Frankfurter,
his frequent antagonist on the Court, had no similar intent. Frankfurter's
opinions were written in the language of intellectual rather than personal
discourse. Frankfurter's diction is Latinate, formal, and abstract; his syntax
is complicated and even tortuous. Jerome Frank apparently once wrote a
parody of Frankfurter's style: the Gettysburg Address as an opinion rendered
in Frankfirterese, which begins "A semi-centennial, three decades and seven
winter solstices preceding the present, our paternal progenitors gestated and
regurgitated upon the western hemisphere (49 longitude 38 latitude) a pristine
comnonwealth."' Like most successful parodies, it reveals something im-
39. NEWMAN, supra note 12, at 19 (quoting Black). In law school Black took a course
in rhetoric, American literature, and English composition from Dr. Charles H. Barnwell, who,
"whether he knew it or not," taught Black the virtues of brevity. Id.
40. NEWMAN, supra note 12, at 404 (quoting Black).
41. ROBERT J. GLENNON, TE ICONOCLAST AS REFORMER: JEROME FRANK'S IMPACT ON
AMEICAN LAW 203 n.103 (1985). Olennon cautions that although the typescript was found
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portant about its target. A Frankfurter opinion, even an authentic one, was
addressed to the educated reader who was prepared to wrestle with the au-
thor's dense prose rather than to Black's common reader. Whereas Black's
style implied a direct link between the Court's decisions and all Americans,
Frankfurter's style implied the need for an intermediary to translate the
message into the language of laymen.
The idea of the Justice as a rarified expert was natural to Frankfurter,
who spent twenty-six years on the Harvard Law School faculty studying and
writing about the Court before joining it in 1939. He revered the law school
as "the most democratic institution I know anything about,"42 a meritocratic
society where he had excelled as a student and where he chose to teach only
the brightest students.43 G. Edward White has described this tension in Frank-
furter between his twin passions for democracy and intellectual excellence:
Frankfurter reconciled intellectual elitism with democracy through the
notions of paternalism and social responsibility. He believed that the
masses needed opportunities to achieve elite status, but that they could
recognize those opportunities only ifeducated by an elite. Public-minded-
ness was the obligation attendant on one's rise in the meritocracy. The
expertise and elite status achieved in reward for surviving the competition
of the educational system was to be used to prepare the way for other
entrants. American citizens had the capacity for self-improvement, and
even self-government, Frankfurter believed, if shown the proper tech-
niques; those techniques were to be conveyed to them by elite leadership."
To Frankfurter, the Court itself was a highly imperfect meritocracy with him-
self at its peak, and he enthusiastically assumed the responsibilities of "elite
leadership." He treated the courtroom as a classroom by dominating oral argu-
ment with his relentless questions4' and irritated the other Justices by lecturing
them in conference, where Chief Justice Hughes would sometimes call him
"Professor Frankfurter, "I and by sending them helpful memos to improve their
opinions.47 Frankfurter's effort-to lead the Court faltered when the Justices he
in Frank's "papers and with his handwriting on it," it is still "possible that Frank only contrib-
uted to the final spoof." Id. at 204.
42. FRANKFURTER, supra note 19,at 19.
43. 0. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 326 (1976).
44. Id. at 326-27.
45. According to Douglas, "Black and Frankfurter probably led the list in intensity of
questioning .... Some of us would often squirm at Frankfurter's seemingly endless questions
that took the advocate round and round and round." WH.UAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS
1939-1975, at 180-81 (1980).
46. LIVA BAKER, FELIx FRANKFURTER 220 (1969).
47. MELVIN I. UROFSKY, FEux FRANKFURTER: JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AND INDIVIDUAL
LIBERTIEs 46-48 (1991). For Urofsky's account of Frankfurter's failed effort to become the
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considered his inferiors refused to accept his guidance, but his belief in the
Justice as educator survived in his opinions.
Frankfurter's opinions convey his strong sense of academic superiority
even before the reader engages the text. There are frequent footnotes to schol-
arly sources, which may range in a single opinion from the multi-volume works
of Jefferson and Madison' to books by Bagehot and Santayana 9 One dissent
ends with a three-page passage quoted from James Bradley Thayer' and
includes a passing reference to Socrates."' Some opinions even come with
elaborate appendices. In Colegrove v. Green,52 in which Frankfurter wrote for
the Court to dismiss a redistricting claim as a political question, he attached
three pages oftables showing population variations in all states and four pages
ofdistricting maps. 3 Concurring in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 4
he included two appendices of fourteen pages charting all federal legislation
authorizing seizure of industrial property and all executive seizures of indus-
trial plants;5 each appendix page folds out from the volume to a size more than
double that of the rest of the volume. The academic apparatus sends a clear
message: this is the work of a scholarly expert, and a willing reader may
approach and learn.
The voice that speaks to the reader through the text reinforces that mes-
sage. The diction is formal and at times slightly archaic. It is hard to imagine
any other member of the Roosevelt Court writing about "embroilment in
politics '5 6 or the "augustness" of constitutional issues5" or whether the Court
should "excogitate" a defect in a judgment."'' A typical sentence may pile up
multi-syllabic words, as when Frankfurter wrote of the effectiveness of the flag
salute "in inculcating concededly indispensable feelings,"59 or reverse the
conventional order of subject and verb, as when he observed that "[flive times
Court's acknowledged intellectual leader, see id. at 45-63; see also JOSEPH P. LASH, FROM THE
DIARiEs OF FEiX FRNKFuRTER. 76 (1975).
48. See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594 n.3 (1940).
49. See id. at 597 n.5.
50. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,667-71 (1943) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
51. See id. at 655 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
52. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
53. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 557-63 (1946).
54. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
55. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,615-28 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
56. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. at 554.
57. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 651 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
58. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 12 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
59. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 662 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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has the precise question now before us been adjudicated."' A single sentence
from Frankfurter's concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube illustrates the
cumulative impact of high diction and elaborate syntax: "It would be not
merely infelicitous draftsmanship but almost offensive gaucherie to write such
a restriction upon the President's power in terms into a statute rather than to
have it authoritatively expounded, as it was, by controlling legislative his-
tory.1'6 The point is not a complex one - he argued that congressional purpose
may be found outside statutory text - but the sentence openly challenges the
reader to untangle the expression. On one of the rare occasions when he
attempted playfulness, the result landed with a thud. This passage opens
Frankfurter's Youngstown concurrence: "Before the cares of the White House
were his own, President Harding is reported to have said that government after
all is a very simple thing. He must have said that, if he said it, as a fleeting
inhabitant of fairyland. The opposite is the truth."62 The first sentence makes
its point with straightforward diction and syntax, though the phrase "were his
own" has a slightly old-fashioned ring. It is the next sentence, with its "fleeting
inhabitant of fairyland," that reveals Frankfiurter's discomfort with even mild
humor in an opinion setting and his inability to strike a whimsical note.
Although he was a conversationalist of humor and charm, as his sessions for
the Columbia University oral history project illustrate, to Frankfirter opinion
writing remained serious, even solemn, business.'
Frankfurter wrote in the voice of the scholar and, at times, of the pedant.
Unlike Black, who aimed his opinions directly at a broad readership, Frank-
furter wrote for members of a select society, the serious readers able to pene-
trate his syntax and decipher his language. His constant theme is the need for
judicial restraint and deference to the democratic will, but his unapologet-
ically elitist style reflects an unwillingness to restrain his academic tendencies
in the service of unmediated communication of his message to the lay public.
The tension White has identified between Frankfurter's meritocratic and elitist
strains finds expression in opinions whose content seems perpetually at war
with their form. Although Frankfiter once wrote that "legal opinions are not
conducive to biographical revelation,"' his own opinions prove the opposite.
In their style and form they reveal the central elements of his professional life:
his academic triumphs at Harvard, his scholar's pride, and his preferred
judicial role as a professor of the law.
60. Id. at 664 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
61. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 603 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
63. See generally FRANKFURTER, supra note 19.
64. FELx FRANKFURTER, M. JusTIcE HoumEs AND THE SUPREm CouRT 45 (1961).
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3. Justice Douglas: The Rugged Individualist
If Frankfurter wrote for the specialists and Black for the general public,
then Douglas in one sense wrote for himself. The Court's premier individual-
ist, Douglas saw himself as the champion of society's outsiders, and his con-
stitutional jurisprudence consistently upholds the rights of minorities, work-
ers, and assorted nonconformists in the face of restrictive statutes and doc-
trines. His opinions, as critics have long noted, reject the conventional judi-
cial tools of legal analysis and precedent in favor of bald assertions of Doug-
las's preferred values.6' These values can be traced in Douglas's autobio-
graphical works to his boyhood experiences climbing the mountains of the
Pacific Northwest, riding the rails with the dispossessed, and absorbing the
poetry of Wordsworth and Whitman." This Romantic strain in Douglas's
thought led him to identify with the outcast, a solitary figure who is always in
pursuit of personal freedom from the constraints of a conformist society.'
Douglas's Romanticism also led him to adopt a mode of opinion writing
that drew directly on his personal vision of American life. Douglas had a
tough, analytic mind that, particularly in his early legal career, he applied to
difficult regulatory problems such as those in the securities industry. As a
Justice, however, Douglas tended to rely on what, as he appreciatively noted,
Wordsworth had called the "feeling intellect," the apprehension of truth
through emotional rather than strictly intellectual channels.68 When Douglas
determined that a liberty interest was central to human experience, he wasted
little time or intellectual energy in crafting a conventional legal argument that
it was also protected by the Constitution; his own conviction was sufficient
support, and he wrote the opinion accordingly. If Douglas's opinions tended
to disregard external legal sources in favor of personal validation, they also
tended to worry less about the audience than about the author. Douglas wrote
quickly and rarely looked back; his confidence in his own work product was
65. For a review of criticism of Douglas's jurisprudence, ae Melvin I. Urofsky, William
0. Douglas as a Common Law Judge, 41 DUKE L.J. 133, 134-40 (1991).
66. Douglas's two autobiographical accounts of his youth are Of Men and Mountains
(1950) and Go East Young Man: The Early Years (1974).
67. See Laura Krugman Ray,Autobiography and Opinion: The Romantic Jurisprudence
of Justice William 0. Douglas, 60 U. PrrT. L. REV. 707, 711-23 (1999) (providing study of
Romantic elements in Douglas's thought).
68. Douglas cited the phrase "feeling intellect" in the preface to Go East, YoungMan, the
first volume of his autobiography. WILUAM 0. DOUGLAS, GO EAST, YOUNG MAN: THE EARLY
YEARS xi (1974). Douglas attributes the phrase to Wordsworth without giving the precise
source; it appears in Book Fourteenth of The Prelude, the poet's autobiographical poem which
describes the role played by nature in his emotional and literary development. WI.UAM
WORDSWORTH, THE PRELUDE: 1799, 1805, 1850 at 471 (Jonathan Wordsworth et al. eds.,
1979). See Ray, supra note 67, at 711-18,737-38 (discussing role played by Wordsworth and
Whitman in Douglas's intellectual development).
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absolute.6 9 Unlike Black, who worked with his law clerks to revise and hone
his drafts, Douglas treated opinion writing as an essentially solitary enterprise,
using his clerks principally to research large issues and review first drafts for
errors. In the solipsistic Douglas chambers, the Justice played all the roles;
he was simultaneously the source of the law announced by the opinion, its
efficient author, and its approving reader.
Douglas's opinions on the right to travel illustrate the perfect assurance
of the judicial voice that speaks from its own experience." An inveterate
hiker and traveler himself, Douglas spent his summers in the American wild-
erness or on trips abroad financed by publishing numerous books about his
adventures in remote locations. That appetite for travel finds expression as
well in his majority opinion for Kent v. Dulles," where the Court declared the
right to travel a liberty interest protected by the Fifth Amendment.73 Douglas
wrote with simplicity and directness that travel "may be as close to the heart
of the individual as the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads. Freedom
of travel is basic in our scheme of values."7 4 The personal force of that posi-
tion became clearer when Douglas again wrote for the Court in Papachristou
v. City of Jacksonville" to strike down an overbroad vagrancy ordinance as
unconstitutional.76 This time the right at issue was one even closer to Doug-
las's heart, the right he described as "loafing" or "wandering" or "strolling,"
moving aimlessly through the landscape for the pure pleasure of movement.
Again, Douglas writes with the unqualified confidence of a lifelong wanderer:
These unwritten amenities have been in part responsible for giving our
people the feeling of independence and self-confidence, the feeling of
creativity. These amenities have dignified the right of dissent and have
honored the right to be nonconformists and the right to defy submissive-
ness. They have encouraged lives of high spirits rather than hushed,
suffocating silence."
69. SIMON, supra note 19,at 12,352.
70. Black asked his clerks to revise his drafts and then worked with them through the
editing process. NEWMAN, supra note 12, at 326; cf SIMON, supra note 19, at 225 (providing
account of Douglas's much more limited use of his clerks). When Ven Countryman, then
Douglas's clerk, reworked a Douglas draft, the Justice included only a single footnote from
Countryman's version in the final product. Id. at 226.
71. See Ray, supra note 67, at 735-44 (detailing Romantic elements in Douglas's opin-
ions).
72. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
73. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
74. Id. at 126.
75. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
76. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (finding ordinance
unconstitutionally void for vagueness).
77. Id. at 164.
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The elements of the Douglas self that appear in his autobiographical works are
all contained in this passage: the independent outsider who rejects convention;
the dissident who defies authority; the exuberant, creative mind that refuses to
be limited by the tradition of judicial restraint and decorum. The "unwritten
amenities" are those that figure prominently in the life of the traveler and
outdoorsman that Douglas shaped for himself and that he found protected by
the Constitution. In Kent he relied on three case citations and a long quotation
from a scholar's article to support his basic proposition. 8 In Papachristou,
written fourteen years later, the authorities cited are literary rather than legal
and reflect Douglas's personal vision of the quintessential American canon:
The amenities are "embedded in Walt Whitman's writings, especially in his
'Song of the Open Road.' They are reflected, too, in the spirit of Vachel
Lindsay's 'I Want to Go Wandering,' and by Henry D. Thoreau." '7 9 In this
opinion, constitutional jurisprudence and personal experience merge in a text
that presents the law as an expression of the author's life."° This is jurispru-
dence as autobiography, a form of opinion writing unique to Douglas.
The voice that speaks in Papachnstou has the authentic ring of the un-
mediated self. Whereas Frankfurter saw the revelation ofthe self as a betrayal
of the judicial role and carefully adopted a scholarly voice for his opinions,
Douglas rejected the distinction between person and judge. A case that chal-
lenged the practice of broadcasting radio programs in District of Columbia
streetcars illustrates the contrast between their two approaches to opinion
writing. "' For Frankfurter, who was a frequent streetcar passenger, there was
no choice but recusal. As he elaborated in an unusual statement published as
part of the case, a judge must "submerge private feelings on every aspect of
a case,""2 but that restraint was not possible here. Thus, he concluded, "[m]y
feelings are so strongly engaged as a victim of the practice in controversy that
I had better not participate in judicial judgment upon it.""3 This sharp separa-
tion of the personal from the judicial was as alien to Douglas as it was gospel
to Frankfurter. For Douglas, personal experience qualified a Justice to write
with authority, just as his years as a practiced wanderer qualified him to
protect the right to loaf. In opinions like Papachristou, the boundary between
78. Kent, 357 U.S. at 126-27.
79. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 164.
80. Douglas made a similar point a term later, in Doe v. Bolton, in which he concurred
in striking down abortion regulations. See 410 U.S. 179, 209 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
Douglas catalogued unenumerated constitutional rights, including "freedom to walk, stroll, or
loaf " Id. at213.
81. See Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) (finding operation of radio
service and city's decision to permit operation constitutional).
82. Id. at 466 (Frankfurter, J., mem.).
83. Id. at 467 (Frankfurter, J., mem.).
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private and professional life dissolves, and the voice that speaks is that of a
person rather than a persona.
4. Justice Jackson: The Pragmatic Man of Letters
Self-revelation does not guarantee self-knowledge. Douglas observed
critically of Robert Jackson, the fourth member of the quartet to join the
Roosevelt Court, that "[h]e loved to write essays and publish them as opin-
ions, ' 4 a charge that could apply just as easily to its maker. As was often the
case with Douglas, however, he had a point. Jackson might not have enjoyed
the same educational advantages as his colleagues, but he combined an acute
intelligence with a love of literature and a remarkable ear for language. His
opinions display a distinctive style and range of allusion that identify them at
once as Jackson's work. When he wrote at the peak of his form, his opinions
occupied a niche of their own, somewhere between conventional judicial
analysis and elegant jurisprudential essays.
What most distinguishes Jackson from almost all other Supreme Court
Justices - Holmes and Cardozo are the exceptions - is his sure touch. Jack-
son's choice of diction is often slightly surprising but, on reflection, precise
and revealing. The practice of expelling aliens after a long residence here
"bristles with severities";" the Constitution's due process language is "cryptic
and vagrant""" workers may be "so crafty and subtle as to constitute a special
menace.1'' Jackson's metaphors also tend to startle and illuminate. An inade-
quate court record "shows us something of the strings as well as the mario-
nettes";" in striking down an ordinance regulating speech the majority may
"convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact";89 unless citizen-
ship guarantees the right to enter any state, "our heritage of constitutional
privileges and immunities is only a promise to the ear to be broken to the
hope, a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will."" Al-
though these images have a literary surface, they also have a solid core of
sense that can withstand logical as well as stylistic analysis.
Jackson's literary range is evident as well in the breadth of his allusions,
which include Plato,9' Milton,92 Gilbert and Sullivan,93 and Mark Twain.94
84. DOUGLAS, supra note 45, at 32.
85. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580,587 (1952).
86. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 534 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
87. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 16 (1944).
88. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 166 (1943) (Jackson, J., concurring).
89. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
90. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 186 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring).
91. See Douglas, 319 U.S. at 166 (Jackson, J., concurring) (advocating informed deci-
sionmaking).
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But Jackson never scattered these allusions through the text in a mere show
of erudition. When, for example, Jackson rejected the Court's explanation for
upholding an administrative decision that was previously disapproved, he
turned to Twain to capture the commonsensical quality of his objection to the
Court's inconsistency: "I give up. Now I realize fully what Mark Twain meant
when he said, 'The more you explain it, the more I don't understand it.'1 95 On
another occasion his allusion underscores the contradictory strands in a Court
opinion that endorses separation of church and state while approving public
support for transportation to parochial schools: "The case which irresistibly
comes to mind as the most fitting precedent is that of Julia who, according to
Byron's reports, 'whispering "I will ne'er consent," - consented.' 96 Byron's
poem of ironic seduction would not immediately come to most, if any, judicial
minds, and the linkage seems at first an example of metaphysical wit, "the
most heterogeneous ideas... yoked by violence together."07 But Jackson's
point is the ease with which the majority, like Julia, could speak the conven-
tional rhetoric of denial while succumbing to the temptation of a sympathetic
factual situation. Like Douglas in Papachristou, Jackson relied on a literary
rather than a legal precedent, but in Jackson's hands the reference makes a
sharp point about judicial methodology.
The stylistic quality most characteristic of Jackson's prose is inversion,
a deft twist that transforms a direct statement into a complex perception or even
a paradox. These inversions express what Paul Freund has called Jackson's
"dialectical mind - recognizing principles in collision,"" a skeptical strain that
usually kept Jackson from embracing easy options. Jackson was more likely
to see both sides of an issue, to weigh them against each other, and to choose
what he considered a pragmatic resolution to a particular case." This tendency
made him particularly sensitive to unexamined abstractions, which his opin-
92. See Craig v. Hamey, 331 U.S. 367, 396 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (discussing
nature of judges).
93. See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214,232 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (discussing faults
of electoral college).
94. See S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 214 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(expressing confusion over majority's reasoning).
95. Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting).
96. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 19 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
97. Samuel Johnson, Cowley, in LrvEs OF ThE ENGLISH POETS, vol. 1,20 (G.B. Hill ed.,
1905); see T.S. Eliot, The MetaphysicalPoets, SleCTED ESSAYS 241 (1912) (providing classic
discussion of metaphysical imagery).
98. Paul A. Freund, Mr. Justice Jackson and Individual Rights 29, 36, in Ma. JUSTICE
JACKSON" FouR LECTURES iN His HONOR (1969).
99. See Laura K. Ray, A Law Clerk and His Justice: *hat William Rehnquist Did Not
Learn from Robert Jackson, 29 IND. L. REV. 535, 559-67 (1996) (discussing Jackson's dialecti-
cal jurisprudence).
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ions often puncture with a tidy thrust. Responding to the majority's contention
that judges as a group are impervious to criticism, Jackson found them to be all
too human: "And if fame - a good public name - is, as Milton said, the 'last
infirmity of noble mind,' it is frequently the first infirnity of a mediocre
one.111°° He could, at the same time, reject both Communism and government
censorship: "It is not the function of our Government to keep the citizen from
falling into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep the Government from
falling into error." '101 His most celebrated inversion is a deflation ofthe Court's
institutional majesty: "We are not final because we are infallible, but we are
infallible only because we are final.""02 Like most of Jackson's rhetorical
flourishes, this formulation is not merely clever; it distills his own skeptical
perspective on the limits of the Court's role.
Jackson came to the Court from the executive branch, in which he served
as a zealous advocate for all of Roosevelt's initiatives, including the lend-
lease program and the ill-fated court-packing plan. As a Justice, however, he
recognized that his new role required a reorientation. Jackson's celebrated
concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube, probably his most famous opinion,
illustrates the way in which he detached himself from his earlier career with-
out abandoning its lessons. Counsel for the government modeled its argument
in support of seizure on Jackson's position paper as attorney general in an
earlier case, and Jackson opened his concurrence with an oblique acknowl-
edgment of his former role. 3 "Anyone," he observes, "who has served as
legal adviser to a President in time of transition and public anxiety" would
understand the benefits and dangers of "undefined presidential powers."'"
The shift to the first person in the next sentence makes explicit that Jackson
himself had that experience and that it was probably "a more realistic influ-
ence on my views than the conventional materials of judicial decision.1
10 5
That assessment turns out to be more of a disclaimer than a confession, how-
ever, and Jackson's writing is quite precise in differentiating between the
perspective of an executive branch official and that of a judge. He could, after
his time in the cabinet, appreciate counsel's sweeping assertion of inherent
presidential power, but, as he drily noted, his current role precluded agree-
ment: "[A] judge cannot accept self-serving press statements of the attorney
for one of the interested parties as authority in answering a constitutional
100. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 396 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
101. Am. Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 442-43 (1950) (Jackson, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
102. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
103. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
104. Id. (Jackson, J., concurring).
105. Id. (Jackson, J., concurring).
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question, even if the advocate was himself. " 6 A judge could, however, draw
on his executive branch experience for his pragmatic sense of the broad power
available to a president outside the constitutional framework, which becomes
in turn an argument against an expansive interpretation of Article II. That
pragmatic sense of where government power actually resides is expressed,
characteristically, by way of metaphor: "We may say that the power to legis-
late for emergencies belongs in the hands of Congress, but only Congress
itself can prevent power from slipping through its fingers."'" The opinion
illustrates Jackson's usual approach to a legal problem: first viewing the issue
from disparate angles and then reaching a practical solution that favors one
position without entirely discarding the other. This dialectical quality to Jack-
son's opinions, captured stylistically by inversion and metaphor, gives them
their unmistakable tone of slightly detached urbanity.
Jackson spoke in the most complex voice of the Roosevelt Court quartet
and in its only voice that rose to the level of literary style. The elegance of
Jackson's prose should have the effect of distancing the reader, and it is true
that his work lacks the easy accessibility of a Black or Douglas opinion, al-
though it also lacks the stiffness of Frankfirter's academic prose. Instead of
distancing the reader, however, Jackson's prose instead invites the reader to
join, or at least to eavesdrop on, the kind of conversation that we might expect
to hear at a Washington political salon in a Gore Vidal novel. Jackson's voice
is that of a witty and self-deprecating companion who can invoke William
James one minute and the Easter bunny the next, at once erudite and charm-
ing. " An ambitious man who at various times aspired to become president or
chief justice, Jackson remained skeptical about the possibility of complete
judicial detachment, grouping "dispassionate judges" together with "Santa
Claus or Uncle Sam or Easter bunnies" as mythical beings.1" His style reflects
that stance, slightly aloof but never disengaged, part ofthe Court but better able,
or more willing, than most of his colleagues to acknowledge the imperfections
of the judicial process. If Black crafted his opinions for the common man and
Frankfurter for the intellectual elite, then Jackson wrote for the sophisticated
reader who could appreciate the art of striking delicate judicial balances in
elegant prose.
C. Personal Revelations and Neutral Decisionmakers
The distinctive styles of Black, Frankfirter, Douglas, and Jackson reveal
something about each author's personality, but they provide almost no hard
106. Id. at 647 (Jackson, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 654 (Jackson, J., concurring).
108. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 93-94 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(noting that right to make enormous assumptions lies at core of religious liberty).
109. Id at94.
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fiacts. A reader of Jackson's opinions would learn that he had been counsel
to a president, but not that he had practiced law in Jamestown, New York, or
served as a much admired Solicitor General. A reader of Black's opinions
would learn that he had been a Senator, but would learn nothing about his
Alabama roots or his passion for tennis. And a reader of Frankfurter's opin-
ions would never learn that he had been a student and professor at Harvard
Law School. A reader of Douglas's opinions might learn a bit more - that
Douglas grew up in the West, for example, or that he traveled widely. In
general, however, even these Justices who felt free to write in personalized
prose styles did not feel free to write about aspects of their personal or profes-
sional lives that might have been relevant to the cases before them. That
reserve has remained one of the durable conventions of opinion writing.
Although a judicial author is identified by name and although biographical
information may be widely known or readily available, within the four comers
of an opinion the author assumes a featureless mask that conceals the particu-
larities of background or professional experience or individual taste.
The convention of impersonality in opinion writing is closely tied to a
cornerstone of our legal system, the idea that cases are resolved by neutral
decisionmakers. A judge, who discloses any personal preferences risks sus-
picion that he decides cases to advance those preferences, while a judge who
presents a blank fagade seems more likely to be relying on neutral legal
principles. The presumption is clearly flawed: a circumspect judge may
stealthily pursue a private agenda, while a judge inclined to confide in the
reader may well apply the law scrupulously. Our judicial system, particularly
at the Supreme Court level, has nonetheless adopted the model of judicial
reserve as a way of assuring both the appearance and the reality of impersonal
jurisprudence.
A corollary of that model is the powerful belief that the members of a
collegial court should conduct their discussions in private, during which they
may air highly personal and even confrontational views, but that published
opinions should adopt a tone of genteel decorum. In the last years of the
nineteenth century, when the dissenting opinion was itself regarded as suspect
for disclosing internal conflicts, one commentator compared the decision-
making process to family squabbles that should be decently concealed from
public view." 0 The Supreme Court has long accepted and acted on this belief
in privacy and decorum. The Court's conferences are attended only by the
Justices themselves, who ceremonially shake hands with one another in a ges-
ture of fellowship before the session begins. Until recently, the members of
110. According to Henry Wollman, "The curtain should not be raised to present the dis-
agreeable picture of family discord and want of harmony." Henry Wollman, Evils of DiTsentng
Opinions, 57 ALB. L. REV. 74,75 (1898).
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the Court also subscribed to the tradition of genteel disagreement in print,
although some of Justice Scalia's pointed separate opinions have introduced
a more candid rhetoric of dissent.
The four Roosevelt Court Justices challenged some of these conventions
of Court behavior. They tended to divide into two clearly defined jurispru-
dential camps - Black and Douglas allied against Frankfurter and Jackson -
and the relations between Justices were sometimes fractious, with an occa-
sional episode. of open warfare that exposed the Court to unaccustomed
publicity."' Opinions were at times the chosen weapons for their conflicts,
with threats of strong language and public denunciation, but the Justices
generally backed down at the last minute and preserved surface decorum. 112
Although some sniping continued in private messages circulated among them,
their opinions never became a public battleground for their personal antago-
nisms.
If they generally observed the convention of decorum in opinion writing,
the Roosevelt quartet on occasion disregarded the convention of absolute
impersonality. There are a handful of opinions in which an autobiographical
fact is dropped into an opinion, like a clue in a mystery novel, to offer the alert
reader a slightly altered perspective on the argument presented. A later
generation of Justices made a more direct assault on the convention, introduc-
ing powerful emotional responses into their opinions and undermining the
idea of the impersonal decisionmaker. A comparison of these two varieties
of self-revelation, the factual and the emotional, suggests that there is a limit
to the degree of personalized discourse that Court opinions can accommodate.
1. Past Careers and Present Opinions: Jackson and Black
Jackson was the most direct of the four Justices in invoking his own past,
perhaps because he had the greatest need to do so. As both Attorney General
and Solicitor G~neral for the Roosevelt administration and later as the United
States's chief war crimes prosecutor at Nuremberg, Jackson had played a vis-
111. In the most celebrated incident, Jackson criticized Black for failing to recuse himself
in a case argued by a former law partner, angering Black and prompting press coverage of the
dispute. See Dennis J. Hutchinson, The Black-Jackson Feud, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 203-43
(offering thorough account of this episode and its ramifications).
112. When the Court confronted the conviction of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg for conspir-
acy to commit espionage, Douglas threatened to publish a dissent from the Court's denial of
certiorari. Jackson responded by announcing that he would change his vote to support a grant,
and Douglas withdrew his dissent For an account of the entire Rosenberg episode, see SIMON,
supra note 19, at 301-313. For two accounts disagreeing about Douglas's behavior, see gener-
ally William Cohen, Justice Douglas and the Rosenberg Case: Setting the Record Straight, 70
CORNELL L. REV. 211 (1985); Michael E. Parrish, Justice Douglas and the Rosenberg Case:
A Rejoinder, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 1048 (1985).
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ible role in some of the major events of the century, and that role had a way
of reappearing in the Supreme Court chamber. During the Youngstown argu-
ment, the Solicitor General, Philip Perlman, openly acknowledged that the
government's case relied heavily on Jackson's earlier defense of presidential
seizure.' Jackson deftly acknowledged his assertion of broad executive
power while at the same time disowning his prior position: "I claimed every-
thing, of course, like every Attorney General does," he told Perlman; "[i]t was
a custom that did not leave the Department of Justice when I did."1 4 After
this courtroom exchange in a high profile case, Jackson apparently felt com-
pelled to make clear in his concurrence as well that the Justice was distinct
from the former Attorney General. After noting that a judge could not accept
a government attorney's advocacy as constitutional authority "even if the
advocate was himself,""' Jackson sharpened the point further. Even if he
were to consider the earlier case as precedent, his own advocacy would "not
bind present judicial judgment.""' 6 Although the repeated disclaimers empha-
size Jackson's political past, in context they support the norm of the neutral
decisionmaker by insisting on a complete severance of that past from his
judicial present.
Jackson had used self-revelation as a defensive tactic in an earlier case,
Hirota v. MacArthur,"' where he appended an explanation of his decision not
to recuse himself from the Court's consideration of whether it had jurisdiction
to review Japanese war crimes convictions." 8 As in Youngstown, Jackson's
past, this time his role at Nuremberg, raised a question of his neutrality.
Jackson acknowledged that he had "been so identified with the subject of war
crimes that, if it involved my personal preferences alone, I should not sit in
this case.""' 9 The fact that the Court was divided four to four, however,
persuaded Jackson that he should participate to create a majority, but he
believed that "a candid disclosure" of the reasons for his decision was owed
not only to the litigants but "in justice to the Court and to myself.'']20 By
surfacing the question of his own potential bias, Jackson hoped to disarm any
potential critics. The revelation is less about his involvement with war crimes
113. According to Maeva Marcus, Perlman told Jackson that the government did "lay a lot
of it at your door." MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEzJuRE CASE: TiE LAMS OF
PRESiDENTiAL PowER 172 (1977).
114. Id.
115. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 647.
116. Id. at 649 n.17.
117. 335 U.S. 876 (1948).
118. Hirota v. MacArthur, 335 U.S. 876 (1948).
119. Id. at 879 (Jackson, J., mem.).
120. Id. at 881 (Jackson, J., mem.).
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law, which is widely known, than about his personal feelings about that in-
volvement; Jackson asserted something that is impossible to demonstrate, his
belief in his own openmindedness. As he recognized, "he cannot expect
others to consider him as detached and dispassionate on the subject as he
thinks himself to be." ' The formulation is revealing. Jackson, who else-
where made clear his skepticism about dispassionate judges, thought that on
this issue he was "detached and dispassionate," but he made no bolder claim
of certainty. His final disclosure was his hope that a Court majority later
would form on the substantive issue without the need for his vote."r Jack-
son's explanatory statement broke with Court convention in two ways. First,
it forthrightly raised the question of recusal, which almost always was handled
in complete silence (Frankfurter's statement in Pollak is another rare excep-
tion). Second, it exposed to view a Justice's personal evaluation of the degree
to which his earlier conduct may have compromised his impartiality. The
Hirota statement was written not with Jackson's usual cool urbanity but with
the warmer tones of a Justice caught between what he recognized as "dis-
agreeable alternatives" and willing for once to expose to view his assessment
of himself."
Jackson's urbanity was restored two years later in McGrath v. Kristen-
sen,"'24 in which he again confronted and expressly disowned his earlier
attorney general's opinion on an immigration law issue before the Court.2 '
The concurrence is both candid and self-deprecating in its treatment of his
prior position, which he called "as foggy as the statute the Attorney General
was asked to interpret."' 26 Jackson admitted to having personally argued this
flawed position to the Court, and thus no "confession and avoidance can
excuse the then Attorney General."'" The final paragraph of the opinion is
cited often, most recently by Justice Souter when he changed his mind on a
First Amendment issue, for its artful apology." After quoting the formula-
tions used by other judges caught in the same predicament, Jackson concluded
in his distinctive voice: "If there are other ways of gracefully and good-
naturedly surrendering former views to a better considered position, I invoke
121. Id. (Jackson, J., mem.).
122. Id. (Jackson, J., mem.).
123. Id. at 879 (Jackson, J., mem.).
124. 340 U.S. 162 (1950).
125. McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162, 176 (1950) (Jackson, J., concurring).
126. Id. (Jackson, J., concurring).
127. Id. at 177 (Jackson, J., concurring).
128. City of Eric v. Pap's AM., 529 U.S. 277,316-17 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring and
dissenting). In City of Erie, Souter acknowledged his past failure to demand an evidentiary
basis for his decision. Id. Souter quoted "Justice Jackson's foolproof explanation of a lapse of
his own, when he quoted Samuel Johnson, 'Ignorance, sir, ignorance.'" Id. at 316.
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them all.' ' 29 The issue in McGrath, a provision of the Immigration Act, was
considerably less weighty than the presidential seizure of Youngstown or the
war crimes of Hirota, and Jackson could afford to approach his shift in per-
spective in a more playful spirit. The strategy, however, remained the same:
Jackson invoked his past role as Attorney General to defend his judicial per-
formance, this time from the charge of inconsistency.
Jackson's defensive treatment of his past career contrasts strongly with
Black's invocation of his Senate career as useful training for the bench.
Although Black did not refer often to his political career, his concurrence in
Duncan v. Louisiana30 draws a direct line between the work of a Senator and
the work of a judge."' Black concurred in the Court's holding that the Four-
teenth Amendment guarantees trial by jury, but he continued to assert his long-
standing position that the entire Bill of Rights is incorporated in the Fourteenth
Amendment. Referring to his 1947 dissent inAdamson v. California, which
included a thirty page appendix describing the history of the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment,' 32 Black explicitly tied his historical analysis to his
service in the Senate:
My appraisal of the legislative history followed 10 years of legislative
experience as a Senator of the United States, not a bad way, I suspect, to
learn the value of what is said in legislative debates, committee discus-
sions, committee reports, and various other steps taken in the course of
passage of bills, resolutions, and proposed constitutional amendments."
The characteristically conversational tone - "not a bad way, I suspect" - gently
asserts Black's senatorial expertise, a point reinforced a page later when he
insisted on the strong influence of congressional leaders on the votes of mem-
bers as something "I know from my years in the United States Senate.""
34
Black could have made the same point in a more oblique way, referring gener-
ally to what "anyone acquainted with the realities of the United States Senate
knows."' 3' Either way, the message is the same: a Justice who has written
legislation, steered it through the committee process, and voted on the floor is
a more qualified reader of legislative history than an academic like Frankfurter
or a practitioner like Harlan, two opponents on the incorporation issue."3
129. McGrath, 340 U.S. at 178.
130. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
131. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
132. 332 U.S. 46,68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
133. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 164-65 (Black, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 165 (Black, J., concurring).
135. Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168,203 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
136. In his Duncan concurrence Black responded to a 1947 law review article by the dis-
tinguished scholar Charles Fairman that had criticized his account of the passage of the Four-
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2. Personal Experience and Private Identity: Douglas and Frankfurter
Just as Black turned to his senatorial career to bolster his authority, Doug-
las typically relied on his personal experience to underscore his strong views.
Dissenting in DeFunis v. Odegaard'37 from the Court's refusal to hear a law
school affirmative action case, Douglas offered his perspective on the differ-
ences among cultural minorities. He began by invoking his background in the
Northwest:
I do know, coming as I do from ndian county in Washington, that many
of the young Indians know little about Adam Smith or Karl Marx but are
deeply imbued with the spirit and philosophy of Chief Robert B. Jim of
the Yakimas, Chief Seattle of the Muckleshoots, and Chief Joseph of the
Nez Perce which offer competitive attitudes towards life, fellow man, and
nature.
13
The passage has an air of showing off, with Douglas taking pleasure in the
assertion of expertise that no one is likely to challenge because it comes from
a source no one can duplicate.139 The clear implication is that Douglas was
familiar with both philosophical traditions. In his obscenity dissents, Douglas
referred to his travels abroad to illustrate his criticism of censorship: "One of
the most offensive experiences of my life was a visit to a nation where book-
stalls were filled only with books on mathematics and books on religion."14
The suggestion, once again, is that Douglas was a man of wider experience
than his colleagues and could place the issue in a broader context. Even when
Douglas had to concede lack of direct knowledge, as he did in his Sierra Club
v. Morton'4 dissent by admitting that "I do not know Mineral King,"'42 that
lack is easily repaired because "Mineral King is doubtless like other wonders
teenth Amendment 391 U.S. at 165. According to Newman, "Like the snake that kept rising
up, Fairman's article was always on Black's mind." NEWMAN, supra note 12, at 359.
137. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
138. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312,335 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
139. Douglas also relied on pure personal knowledge offered without any explanation.
Speaking of the value of the LSAT in evaluating minorities, he noted that "I personally know
that admissions tests were once used to eliminate Jews." Id. He was equally likely to disclaim
direct knowledge, as when he said that "I do not know the extent to which blacks in this country
are imbued with ideas of African Socialism." Id. The clear implication was that his colleagues
were not likely to know, either.
140. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 71 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Douglas had made the same point a few years earlier in another dissent: "I once visited a for-
eign nation where the regime of censorship was so strict that all I could find in the bookstalls
were tracts on religion and tracts on mathematics." Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 654
(1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
141. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
142. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,743 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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of the Sierra Nevada such as Tuolumne Meadows and the John Muir Trail,"'43
which he did know. Douglas's injection of personal experience into his
opinions is a form of self-aggrandizement. He had traveled more widely, had
had contact with more cultures, and had seen more of the world than his
colleagues. In his last full Term at the Court, debilitated by a stroke, Douglas
still found in his ill health an experience that distinguished him and that he
was willing to disclose publicly. Insisting that a Justice could do the work of
the Court in only four days each week, Douglas announced that "I have found
it a comfortable burden carried even in my months of hospitalization."" 4 The
comment was intended to support his liberal interpretation of standing doc-
trine, but its subtext is the familiar Douglas anthem of the self: even in his
weakened condition, he was a more capable Justice than his overworked col-
leagues.
Jackson, Black, and Douglas used their carefully rationed disclosures of
professional or personal experience to strengthen their claims of neutrality,
expertise, or individual merit. By briefly opening a window from conven-
tional judicial prose into autobiographical reference, they appealed to the
reader as the men beneath the robes, products of particularized lives who had
earned the right to speak with special authority on a given issue. These
occasional disclosures also had an unintended effect, the slightly titillating
sensation that accompanies a glimpse of usually forbidden territory. Supreme
Court Justices are the last high government officials to preserve their privacy
from the media. The bulk of their work is performed in chambers or in
conference, where the press and the Freedom of Information Act cannot
penetrate. They wear professional uniforms which tend to standardize them,
concealing differences of size or shape and even muting gender differences.
Within this remote judicial culture, even an occasional sighting of the individ-
ual beneath the robe has a powerful impact on the reader.
It is therefore not surprising that the opening of Justice Frankfurter's
dissent in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette'45 is the most famous
instance of judicial self-revelation in the Court's history. Only three years
earlier, in Minersville School District v. Gobitis,46 Frankffurter had written for
a majority of eight that the state could compel Jehovah's Witness school
children to salute the American flag.' 47 When the Court revisited the issue in
Barnette, Frankfurter found himself in dissent while Jackson wrote for the
new majority which held that compelled flag salutes violated the First and
143. Id. at 744 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
144. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 519 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
145. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
146. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
147. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
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Fourteenth Amendments. Two other Justices, Roberts and Reed, also dis-
sented but did not join Frankfurter's opinion for reasons that the opening
paragraph makes clear.1" As Robert Burt has observed, "Frankfurter wrote
his dissent itself in a manner that made it impossible for any other justice to
join":
14 9
One who belongs to the most vilified and persecuted minority in history is
not likely to be insensible to the freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution.
Were my purely personal attitude relevant I should wholeheartedly associ-
ate myself with the general libertarianviews in the Court's opinion, repre-
senting as they do the thought and action of a lifetime. But as judges we
are neither Jew nor Gentile, neither Catholic nor agnostic. We owe equal
attachment to the Constitution and are equally bound by our judicial
obligations whether we derive our citizenship from the earliest or the latestimmigrants to these shores. "
Far from seeking to join, Roberts had told Frankfurter that the opening sen-
tences were "'a mistake"'; even Frank Murphy, who voted with the majority,
urged Frankfurter as a friend to remove them because inclusion would be
"'catapulting a personal issue into the arena.""' 52 According to his diaries,
Frankfurter offered each Justice a different rationale for rejecting his counsel.
He told Roberts that he felt compelled, despite his own distaste for "public
manifestations," to include the passage because ever since Gobitis appeared,
he had received numerous letters telling him that as a Jew and an immigrant he
had an obligation to protect the rights of minorities.' 53 Frankfurter responded
to Murphy by denying that the passage was "personal" because it was the point
of the opinion that individual identity should play no role in judicial
decisionmaking. 54 These conflicting positions suggest how complicated
Frankfurter's motives were for departing from his characteristically detached
style in Barnette.
Although the opening of Frankfurter's dissent contains an unexpectedly
intimate self-revelation, it is immediately clear that this is not a piece of
uncontrolled emotionalism but a carefully constructed rhetorical strategy.
Frankfurter chose "one," not "I," as the subject of his first sentence, simulta-
148. See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646-47 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (referring to religious identity).
149. ROBERT A. BURT, Two JEWISH JUSTICES: OUTCASTS IN THE PROMISED LAND 49
(1988).
150. 319 U.S. at 646-47 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
151. LASH, supra note 47, at 253. Roberts objected specifically to the first two sentences.
152. Id. at254.
153. See id. (answering Roberts's objections to opening sentences at conference).
154. Id. at 254.
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neously preparing to disclose his religious identity while distancing himself
from that act of disclsoure. It is also clear in context that Jews are the group
described as "the most vilified and persecuted minority in history." The word
"Jew," however, is not mentioned until the third sentence, in which it is paired
with an opposite, "Gentile," and followed by a second pair of opposites, "Cath-
olic" and "agnostic," to indicate a broad range of possible affiliations. The next
sentence expands the field by pairing the earliest and latest American immi-
grants. The point of the passage is to undermine these categories by finding
them irrelevant to the judge's task. Because judges are "neither Jew nor
Gentile, neither Catholic nor agnostic," Frankfurter's own religion could have
no effect on the opinion to follow. If it did - "[w]ere my purely personal
attitude relevant" - then Frankfurter would be on the other side, voting with the
majority to support the rights of the Jehovah's Witnesses. The passage is thus
a deliberate paradox. As a Jewish Justice, Frankfurter was particularly sensi-
tive to the protections of the Constitution, but as a Jewish Justice he could not
allow that sensitivity to influence his decisionmaking. The dramatic disclosure
of his own identity turns out to be a straw man, a construct set up only to be
knocked down, because the whole idea of judicial identity precludes any
attachment to personal identity.
Frankfurter himself supported the view that the opening sentences are
part of a rhetorical strategy rather than an emotional gesture. His diary entry
for June 14, the day the opinion was issued, makes clear that this was no
anguished effusion:
In any event, the sentences will stay in because they are not the products
of a moment's or an hour's or a day's or a week's thought - I had thought
about the matter for months and I deem it necessary to say and put into
print in the U.S. Reports what I conceive to be the basic function of this
Court and the duty of the Justices of this Court."5
The judicial duty to suppress personal identity coincides with Frankfurter's
powerful belief in meritocracy, the lesson learned at Harvard where he found
himself to be "a little fellow" surrounded by tall, self-confident, athletic
members of the Establishment who, at the end of the first year, had flunked
out while Frankfurter ranked first in his class." Although Frankfurter en-
countered anti-Semitism in the legal profession, he rejected advice to change
his "'odd, fun-making"' name" 7 and adopted instead what he called "a very
profoundly wise attitude toward the whole fact that I was a Jew, the essence
of which is that you should be a biped and walk on the two legs that man
155. Id.
156. FRANKPURTER, supra note 19, at 18-19.
157. Id. at 38.
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has.""" In a meritocratic universe, there was no need to disguise or conceal
one's origins. As Richard Danzig has argued, Frankfurter "believed that
assimilation could be made compatible with a distinctive ethnic and religious
identity by insisting on the irrelevance of 'race or religion or the accidents of
antecedents' in the realms to which he sought admission."' 9 The disclosure
of Frankfurter's Jewishness, a widely known fact, in a Court opinion reflects
not a painful dilemma of conflicting personal and professional loyalties but
a confident assertion of the primacy of Frankfutrter's judicial identity.
The sentences remained in Frankfirter's dissent because they expressed
in a particularly vivid and unorthodox manner the highly conventional idea of
judicial neutrality. Frankfirter's point is thus very much like Jackson's
Youngstown disclaimers. Whereas Jackson was at pains to assert that his prior
professional experience as Roosevelt's attorney made him no more likely than
any other Justice to favor a claim of inherent presidential power, Frankfirter
made a parallel assertion that his personal experience as a Jew made him no
more likely to protect First Amendment rights claimed by members of another
vilified and persecuted minority. Frankfirter's true opposite on the Court, in
this as in so many other respects, was Douglas, who openly invoked his per-
sonal experience as a basis for taking jurisprudential positions. In a curious
way, Frankfurter's most personal opinion is not Barnette but Public Utilities
Commission v. Pollak,"W in which his identity as a passenger on Washington
streetcars prevented him from deciding whether radio broadcasts violated
privacy rights. 6 ' As a Jew, he could disengage himself from "the thought and
action of a lifetime," 62 but as a passenger his emotions were "so strongly
engaged" that he could not trust himself to perform his judicial duty with the
required neutrality.
1 63
II. The Rehnquist Court Quartet: Strategic Responses
A. Losing a Voice
The remarkably rich and diverse opinion-writing styles of the Roosevelt
Court quartet represent the end of a judicial golden age. All four of the
Justices largely wrote their own opinions, particularly for the important cases,
158. Id. at 37.
159. Richard Danzig, Justice Frankfurter 's Opinions in the Flag Salute Cases: Blending
Logic and Psychologic in Constitutional Decisionmaking, 36 STAN. L. REv. 675, 696-97
(1984).
160. 343 U.S. 451 (1951).
161. Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Polak, 343 U.S. 451,467 (1951).
162. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 64647 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
163. Pollak, 343 U.S. at 467.
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and stamped their work with their distinctive perspectives and personalities.'6
In the years that have followed, however, the task of opinion writing has fallen
increasingly to law clerks rather than to the Justices. In 1947, each Justice
was provided with a second law clerk; 165 the number has since increased to
four law clerks per Justice.' 66 These larger staffs have contributed to the
current practice whereby law clerks prepare first drafts for comment and
revision by their Justices, the reverse of the way in which Black, for example,
wrote his opinions. The initial choices of structure and diction are made by
recent law school graduates trained in the ponderous, impersonal style favored
by law reviews. "The result," according to Richard Posner, "is not just a loss
of flavor but a loss of information. A judge's style conveys a sense of the
judge that can be used to help piece out his judicial philosophy from his
opinions."'67 When judicial style is homogenized by authors who are under-
164. Black wrote or dictated his first drafts and gave them to his clerk for revision. NEW-
MAN, supra note 12, at 325-26. By the late sixties, however, health problems forced Black to give
his clerks a larger role, and they "started to draft opinions on a regular basis." Id. at 562.
According to John Frank, one of Black's law clerks, Black wrote his own first drafts in the early
1940s "except that toward the end of the year he would let the youngster try his hand at one first
draft of something extremely unimportant" JOHN P. FRANK, MARBLE PALACE: THE SuREME
COURT INAMERICAN LIFE 116-17 (1958). Frankfurter's clerks sometimes were asked to provide
him with elaborate memoranda on important issues and at other times drafted opinions for him.
DAVID O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUmRE COURT IN AMERICAN PoLrTics 169 (3d ed.
1993). Chief Justice Rehnquist, who clerked for Jackson when Youngstown was decided, called
Jackson's concurrence "the sort of opinion in which he felt no need for the help of law clerks."
W.ujAmH. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: How IT WAS, HOW IT IS 93(1987). Rehnquist
and his co-clerk occasionally were asked to do some drafting, id. at 61, but for Youngstown "[w]e
were shown the opinion in draft form, and as I recall, asked to find citations for some of the
propositions it contained, but that was about the extent of our participation." Id. at 93-94.
William Cohen, one of Douglas's law clerks, described his role in the Justice's opinion-writing
process:
Normally, the initial circulation of a Douglas opinion to the chambers of other
Justices would, save for few formal modifications, be identical to the first handwrit-
ten draft. I was allowed to try my hand at a first draft of two or three of the least
significant dissents. But the Justice was willing to entrust a first draft of a minor
opinion to less capable hands only when he had thoroughly explained his position
and had clearly marked the path to be followed. Even then, the finished product
might bear less than a family resemblance to my first efforts.
William Cohen, Justice Douglas: A Law Clerk's View, 26 U. CR. L. REV. 6,7 (1958).
165. Chester A. Newland, Personal Assistants to Supreme Court Justices: The Law
Clerks, 40 OR. L. REV. 299, 303-304 (1961).
166. Martha Swann, Clerks ofthe Justices, in OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 13, at 160.
167. RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRisM AND REFORM 107 (1985). Posner
attributes other trends in opinion writing - increased length, lack of candor, elaborate citations
to secondary materials, numerous footnotes - to the inexperience and law review training of the
clerks. Id. at 108-10.
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standably disinclined to take rhetorical chances, a generic judicial voice dom-
inates the US. Reports, erasing the stamp of judicial personality.
One consequence of this standardized prose is to make any instance of
judicial self-revelation unusually vivid and powerful. The members of the
Rehnquist Court are not given to the kinds of autobiographical reference that
the Roosevelt Court Justices occasionally used, and with one striking excep-
tion - Justice Scalia - they do not produce stylistically distinctive opinions.
They do, however, respond at times in their concurrences and dissents with
strong emotion, and these moments tend to resonate with unusual force
precisely because of the bland background that surrounds them. The sharp
contrast between the usually impersonal tenor of the Rehnquist Court opinions
and the emotional responses of some Justices to particular issues raises at
times the question of when such personal revelations are appropriate and
when they cross the acceptable boundaries of the judicial role.
Four members of the Rehnquist Court - Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices
Kennedy and Scalia, and the late Justice Blackmun - have employed four
different methods of expressing emotion in their separate opinions. Unlike
their Roosevelt Court predecessors, who always remained in control of their
judicial prose even when offering the reader a glimpse of their non-judicial
pasts, the Rehnquist Court Justices occasionally seem to disregard principles
of judicial neutrality and reserve. Their moments of self-revelation startle not
simply because they violate conventions of judicial impersonality, but also
because they suggest the disturbing possibility that the Court's jurisprudence
on highly controversial topics might come to be based not on reason and
precedent, but on the far shakier ground of judicial emotion.
B. Emotional Experience and Judicial Response
1. Justice Kennedy: Agonized Ambivalence
In Texas v. Johnson,'" the flag-burning case that occasioned both politi-
cal and public controversy, two members of the Rehnquist Court wrote
separate opinions that expressed in very different ways their personal re-
sponses to the Court's resolution of a highly contentious issue. 69 Justice
Kennedy joined Justice Brennan's majority opinion striking down a Texas
statute prohibiting flag burning because it violated the First Amendment, but
he appended a brief concurrence to note that his agreement "exacts its per-
sonal toll."' 7° Kennedy has described himself as "'an agonizer"' in his deci-
168. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
169. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 421
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 420 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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sionmaking process,' and his Johnson opinion brings that agony to the
surface of the text:
The hard fact is that sometimes we must make decisions we do not like.
We make them because they are right, right in the sense that the law and
the Constitution, as we see them, compel the result. And so great is our
commitment to the process that, except in the rare case, we do not pause to
express distaste for the result, perhaps for fear of undermining a valued
principle that dictates the decision. This is one of those rare cases."'
The concurrence asserts the conflict between Kennedy's respect for the pow-
erful symbolic meaning of the American flag and his professional commit-
ment to enforcing the Constitution, a conflict which can be resolved only
through a "painful" judgment."7 3 The sentiment echoes Frankfurter's dissent
in Barnette, but whereas Frankfurter embraced judicial separation from
private emotion as a heroic stance, Kennedy lamented the need for the sever-
ance. He seemed uncomfortable aligning himself with the largely liberal
majority of Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Scalia, and the concurrence
tells disappointed conservatives that his heart, if not his decisive vote, re-
mained with the dissent.
The ambivalent message conveyed by the concurrence is echoed by Ken-
nedy's subsequent ambivalence about the fact of the concurrence. Seven years
after the case was decided, Kennedy wondered aloud whether he should have
published his separate opinion. He found "'something objectionable"' in it,
what he called "'this hand-wringing thing"' and "'all the crybaby stuff.""
'l74
Kennedy's discomfort with his own emotionalism is connected with his
uncertainty about the precise nature of the audience for Court opinions. He
has confessed that "'I've never quite had a precise grasp of whom you're
writing for,'""7' and his Johnson concurrence seems aimed at an ill-defined
audience that will both respect and forgive a principled stand if it is accompa-
nied by signs of genuine anguish at the compelled outcome. While Frank-
furter deliberately used a similar predicament as an occasion to deny personal
emotion any valid role in his jurisprudence, Kennedy seemed ambivalent
about his ambivalence, uncertain whether the disclosure of his predicament
would dignify his position or expose it to ridicule. Kennedy's revelation of
his private emotions exposes a fault line that judges generally deny exists; it
is not, after all, part of a Justice's role to like the decisions he renders or to
feel pain when he does not. The expression of discomfort in Johnson intro-
171. Jeffrey Rosen, The Agonizer, NEW YoRKER, Nov. 11, 1996, at 82, 85.
172. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 420-21 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
173. Id. at 421 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
174. Rosen, supra note 171, at 82.
175. Id.
RHETORIC AND EMOTION IN SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 225
duced into the judicial process the idea that a judge's private emotions as well
as his intellect ideally should be satisfied by his decisions, and in doing so it
comes close to undermining the judicial convention of dispassionate neutrality
that Frankfurter and Jackson defended so fiercely.
2. Chief Justice Rehnquist: Strategic Emotionalism
The second variety of emotional expression in Johnson comes from Chief
Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion.' 6 Rehnquist, writing as well for
Justices White and O'Connor, conveyed his powerful certainty about the pro-
tected status of the flag by devoting the first six pages of his opinion to an
extraordinary catalogue of the flag's appearances in poetry, song, and histori-
cal anecdote. Mark Tushnet has called this "an exercise in cultural anal-
ysis,"1" although there is nothing of the analytic in Rehnquist's decision to
assign two pages to the complete text of the poem Barbara Frietchie by John
Greenleaf Whittier, unaccompanied by any commentary except for its bare
introduction as "[olne of the great stories of the Civil War."178 Rehnquist's
approach in presenting pages of unassimilated flag lore before mentioning any
legal sources might more accurately be termed strategic emotionalism. In an
earlier flag desecration dissent, Rehnquist made clear his belief that for this
issue, conventional jurisprudence is insufficient: "The significance of the flag,
and the deep emotional feelings it arouses in a large part of our citizenry,
cannot be fully expressed in the two dimensions of a lawyer's brief or of a
judicial opinion."' 79 By citing the flag's "unique position as the symbol of our
Nation"" as the justification for the Texas statute and illustrating that sym-
bolic function with song and story rather than conventional legal analysis, he
elevated emotion above logic as the informing principle of his opinion.
Commentators frequently have criticized the legal analysis that follows,
particularly Rehnquist's equation of flag burning to "an inarticulate grunt or
roar," undeserving of any constitutional protection," but that criticism is
largely beside the point. Although Rehnquist did not personalize the dissent
in the most obvious way, by writing in the first person as Kennedy and Douglas
did, his dissent nonetheless was written from a personal perspective that cannot
176. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 421 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
177. Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81 ORo. L.J. 251, 302
(1992).
178. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 424 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Rehnquist also quotes a
stanza from Ralph Waldo Emerson's Concord Hymn and one from The Star Spangled Banner.
Id. at 422-23 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
179. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 602 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
180. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 422 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 432 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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be either supported or refuted by cold logic. s 2 The most notable aspect of the
opinion is that the emotional force on which it relies comes not simply from the
author, who did little more than arrange his evidence, but from the reader, who
is expected to respond with what Rehnquist called "an almost mystical rever-
ence" to his account of the flag.1" 3 In literary terminology, this is sentimental-
ism, "an excess of emotion to an occasion."'8' 4 The poetic vignettes that Rehn-
quist selected - Francis Scott Key "[ijntensely moved" when the flag survives
a British bombardment; 5 the Minutemen at Concord firing "the shot heard
round the world;"" 6 Barbara Frietchie risking her "old gray head" to protect the
flag from Confederate troops" 7 - all evoke the grade school classroom of an
earlier generation, with its patriotic lessons instilled through narrative verse.
These vignettes also contain heroic overtones singularly lacking in the circum-
stances of the case: the burning of a flag by political demonstrators protesting
the policies of the Reagan administration during the Republican National
Convention and the subsequent burial of the flag by a distressed observer.' 8
Although Rehnquist chided the majority for its "regrettably patronizing civics
lecture," he offered his own counterpart by overwhelming the mundane facts
of the case with more dramatic literary variations. The opinion seeks to sub-
stitute emotional response for intellectual argument, revealing in the process
something of its author's personal rather than judicial self.
3. Justice Scalia: Indignant Conversation
The third and most complex variety of emotional expression on the
Rehnquist Court occurs in the opinions of Justice Scalia, a confident judicial
stylist in the manner of the Roosevelt Court Justices.' Scalia, like those
Justices, writes most of his own opinions8 9 and is the only member of the
current Court whose work is instantly recognizable by its distinctive rhythm,
conversational tone, and surprising diction. Scalia's most personal opinions
182. Rehnquist used the first person pronoun in the dissent's final sentence: "I would
uphold the Texas statute as applied in this case." Id. at 435 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 429 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). According to Paul Campos, "the dissent tries
to evoke in the reader a visceral, rather than an intellectualized, understanding of its claim."
Paul Campos, Silence and the Word, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 1139, 1143 (1993).
184. M.H.ABRAMS, AGLOSSARY OF LrLRARYTE8S 192 (6th ed. 1993).
185. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 423 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
186. Id. at 422 (Rehnquist, CI, dissenting).
187. Id. at 425 (Rehnquist, CI., dissenting).
188. For a persuasive argument that Whittier's account of Barbara Frietchie - an elderly
woman heroically flying the national flag in defiance of Confederate troops entering Frederick,
Maryland - is "unadulterated fiction" rather than accurate history, see Calvin R. Massey, The
Jurisprudence of Poetic License, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1047, 1049-51.
189. See MARYANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 146 (1994); EDWARD LAZA-
Rus, CLOSED CHAMBERS 271 (1998).
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are those in which he seems to speak directly to the reader in the voice of a
man of common sense whose patience is tried beyond endurance by the follies
of his colleagues. That voice is a carefully constructed artifice, the persona
that conveys emotional reactions as well as legal arguments. Its closest liter-
ary analogue is the speaker of a dramatic monologue, the form in which poets,
most prominently Robert Browning, create a character distinct from its author
through speech alone."9 The typical dramatic monologue gradually, through
artful literary clues, reveals to the reader the character and situation of the
speaker, which may be quite different from the way in which the speaker
presents himself. In Browning's "My Last Duchess," for example, the speaker,
who seems at first to be simply a Renaissance duke showing a visitor the trea-
sures of his art collection, reveals himself to be a cruel husband who brutal-
ized his first duchess for failing to value the honor of being his wife."' In
such accomplished poems, the dramatic monologue is the literary form that
embodies self-revelation. Even in a non-literary setting, the skillful creation
of character through voice engages the interest and emotions of the reader in
a way that ordinary narrative or intellectual argument rarely can.
Scalia's most potent separate opinions resemble the dramatic monologue
in their strongly defined voice and what it reveals about the speaker. The
opinions treat conventional legal materials, such as case law, statutes, and
constitutional history, but at the same time they establish a distance between
the judicial voice and the legal argument it constructs. That voice distin-
guishes itself from "society's law-trained elite," the misguided Justices in the
majority who are imposing their "countermajoritarian preferences" on the sen-
sible democratic majority."9 Scalia uses an assortment of rhetorical devices
to shape this voice. He sprinkles his formal prose with the occasional collo-
quialism: the Court's vague standard for gender discrimination is "Supreme
Court peek-a-boo," '93 which will prevent any "state official in his right
mind"' " from risking litigation by testing it. His syntax is at times informal
or even conversational. Rejecting the Court's criticism of early educators, he
190. The classic study of the dramatic monologue is ROBERT LANGBAUM, THE POETRY OF
EXPERIENCE (1957). Robert A. Ferguson has identified what he terms "the monologic voice"
in judicial opinions, a device which "sometimes seeks its own embodiment by projecting an
actual judicial persona into the frame of an opinion." Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion
as Literary Genre, 2 YALE JL. & HUMAN. 201,206 (1990).
191. ROBERTBROWNINGMyLasiDuchess, in THEPOEMS AND PLAYS OF ROBERT BROWN-
INo 94 (1934).
192. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Romer
v. Evans, Scalia scolds the majority for siding "with the knights rather than the villeins" in the
culture wars and "reflecting the views and values of the lawyer class from which the Court's
Members are drawn." 517 U.S. 620,652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
193. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 574 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 597 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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asks the reader to "let me say a word in their praise,"'95 and he mocks the
Court's "ad-hocery' 96 in departing from precedent by imagining that a state
"should have known that what this Court expected of it was ... yes!, the
creation of a state all-women's program."'" Even an example of cooperative
conduct is drawn from athletics - "the game of soccer. ' "
The persona that emerges is a down-to-earth figure, different from his
colleagues with their arrogant pretensions and murky abstractions. Reading
these opinions, one finds it hard to remember that this persona bears little
resemblance to Scalia's actual resum6 as the son of an academic, a distin-
guished graduate of Georgetown University and Harvard Law School, a prac-
titioner with a prestigious law firm, a prominent attorney and administrator in
the Nixon and Ford administrations, and a professor of law at Georgetown and
the University of Chicago.1" A prime insider, Scalia recreates himself as the
shrewd outsider who has taken upon himself the thankless task of calling his
colleagues to account for their departures from principle, common sense, and
their duty to the democratic majority.
The opinion that most fully illustrates this rhetorical strategy is Scalia's
part concurrence, part dissent in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania v. Casey," in which the Court reaffirmed the central holding of Roe
v. Wade.2 ' The opinion opens with a restrained statement of Scalia's position
on the question of whether the right to abortion is a constitutionally protected
liberty interest: "I am sure it is not."2 2 This simple diction and lean syntax
distinguish his position from what he termed the "exalted" view of the Court
opinion, which speaks of the "'concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life.""'2 3 The plainspoken and re-
strained persona, however, was compelled against his inclination to address
"a few of the more outrageous arguments in today's opinion, which it is
beyond human nature to leave unanswered. '" 214 The remainder of the opinion
is framed as a dialogue of sorts, quoting each "outrageous" passage from the
Court's opinion and following it with a critical response.
195. Id. at 567 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
197.,. Id. at 594 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 584 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
199. See Sally Katzen, Antonin Scalia, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED
BIOGRAPHIEs, 1789-1995, at 511-12 ( Clare Cushman ed., 2d ed. 1995).
200. 505 U.S. 833,979 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting).
201. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
202. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,980 (1992) (Scalia,
J., concurring and dissenting).
203. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting majority opinion).
204. Id. at 981 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting).
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Scalia's Casey opinion makes clear who the adversary is. It is "[t]he
Imperial Judiciary" with its 'Nietzschean vision of us unelected, life-tenured
judges - leading a Volk who will be 'tested by following. ' ' 205 The diction is
powerfully allusive, deliberately evoking the tyrannies of imperial Rome and
the mythology of German nationalism. Scalia allied himself with the "Volk"
by using a much simpler diction to deflate the pretensions of the Court major-
ity. In accusing his opponents of playing a "verbal shell game" to hide their
"raw judicial policy choices," he reduced imperial tyrants to ordinary con
artists.2 6 Rejecting the Court's treatment of stare decisis, Scalia "confess[ed]
never to have heard of this new, keep-what-you-want-and-throw-away-the-rest
version, 2' again the man of common sense confounded by a judicial absur-
dity. The colloquial interjections - "come to think of it,120 "[i]t is beyond
me, 0, 9 t"even in the head of someone like me"210 - reinforce the sense of a
bond between the speaker and the reader, who together can see through the
self-aggrandizing tendencies of the misguided majority.
The rhetorical strategy of Casey allowed Scalia to express strong emo-
tions without appearing to abandon professional control. The conversational
quality of the judicial voice triangulates the opinion by creating an invisible
third party, the reader who shares with the speaker his sense of justified
indignation at the overreaching of the majority. This rhetorical setting reflects
Scalia's signature substantive argument, that his adversaries violate the
constitutional design by imposing their personal value choices instead of
respecting the choices made by a democratic majority through its elected
representatives. By including that majority in the world of the opinion, Scalia
attempts to position himself not as the scourge of his adversaries but as the
champion of the people, respecting their values and speaking their language.
The strategy may not always work - Scalia's harsh criticisms have at times
alienated potential allies on the Court and raised serious concerns about
civility in judicial discourse. But it is an inventive attempt to integrate emo-
tional response with legal argument by creating a sympathetic judicial persona
who reaches beyond the ordinary boundaries of his role.
4. Justice Blackmun: Institutional Emotionalism
Whereas Justice Scalia channels his emotional responses by constructing
a judicial persona, Justice Blackmun employed no comparable rhetorical arti-
205. Id. at 996 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting).
206. Id. at 987 (Sealia, J., concurring and dissenting).
207. Id. at 993 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting).
208. Id. at 994 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting).
209. Id. at 997 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting).
210. Id. at 998 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting).
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fice. His most famous and most controversial separate opinions offer the
remarkable spectacle of a Justice speaking directly and emotionally to the
reader without any pretense of dispassionate neutrality. Reaction to these
opinions has been sharply divided. For Blackmun's many admirers, who
include a number of his former law clerks, the opinions reflect his compassion
and his "real-world sensitivity," giving the Court "its natural sympathy, its
human face."2 ' His critics, while respecting Blackmun's personal modesty
and humanity, focus instead on what Jeffrey Rosen terms "the jurisprudence
of sentiment," the "resort to personal sympathy in order to justify liberal
results."2 2 There is, however, no dispute over Blackmun's primacy as the
author of the Court's most self-revelatory opinions.
Although his opinions usually are discussed together, they more naturally
divide into two distinct varieties of emotionalism. The first variety, repre-
sented most famously by what is commonly known as Blackmun's "Poor
Joshua!" opinion, responds emotionally to the plight of the litigants and builds
on that response to define the Court's legal obligation to provide assistance.2"3
The second variety, represented most vividly by Blackmun's efforts to defend
his landmark abortion rights opinion in Roe v. Wade," 4 exposes directly the
author's reaction to his own position on the Court. The first is a situational
emotionalism, based on the particular facts of the case, while the second is an
institutional emotionalism, based instead on a Justice's relationship to the
Court itself. In Blackmun's hands, both varieties stretched the boundaries of
conventional jurisprudence, but it is his institutional emotionalism that raised
the more serious challenge.
Blackmun's dissent in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of
Social Services expresses strong compassion for the plaintiff; a child severely
beaten by his father after social workers allowed him to remain in his father's
custody. In addition to the cri de coeur "Poor Joshua!," 'a1 which has attracted
so much attention, the brief opinion gives the child's full name, Joshua De-
Shaney, twice in less than two pages.2" 6 Blackmun's determined effort to put
211. Harold Hongju Koh, A Tribute to Justice Harry A. Blacknun, 108 HARv. L. REv. 20,
21-22 (1994). In another piece, Koh, a former law clerk to the Justice, argues that Blackmun's
detractors "confused emotionalism with candor, doctrinal wavering with maturing judgment."
Harold Hongju Koh,Justice Blackmnun and the "WorldOut There," 104 YALE L.J. 23,27 (1994).
212. Jeffrey Rosen, Sentimental Journey, THE NEW REPUBUC 13 (May 2, 1994). Posner
calls the opinions "embarrassing performances." Richard A. Posner, Judges' Writing Styles
(AndDo They Matter?), 62 U. CI. L. REV. 1421, 1434 (1995).
213. DeShaney v. Winnebago Co. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 212 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
214. 410U.S. 113(1973).
215. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 212, 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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a human face on the plaintiff's suffering was intended also to discredit the
majority, which he rebuked for positioning itself as "the dispassionate oracle
of the law, unmoved by 'natural sympathy,"' in deciding that the Fourteenth
Amendment offered the plaintiff no protection." 7 While Jackson questioned
the existence of dispassionate judges, Blackmun found them all too real and
insisted that human emotion can properly inform constitutional interpretation.
He failed, however, to support his point with legal argument; instead, he illus-
trated it with a bluntness that makes the reader uncomfortably aware of its
obvious pitfall, the overwhelming of reason by understandable but undisci-
plined sympathy. The opinion ignores the advice Blackmun recalled receiving
from Justice Black during the brief period when the two overlapped at the
Court: "Always go for the jugular, but don't agonize in public."21
Blackmun employed a similar strategy more successfully in his dissent
from the denial of certiorari in a death penalty case in which he opened his
opinion by projecting one day into the future and imagining the execution of
Bruce Edwin Callins, the defendant, that the Court's vote had now made
inevitable." 9 Blackmun described Callins at the moment the latter is about to
receive his lethal injection, "no longer a defendant, an appellant, or a peti-
tioner, but a man, strapped to a gurney, and seconds away from extinction.o
220
The point, more fully argued than in DeShaney, is the human consequence of
unavoidable unfairness in the administration of the death penalty; and in this
context, the humanizing of the defendant, though bordering on the melodra-
matic, seems relevant and justified. The more serious difficulty with Callins
is its shift from situational to institutional emotionalism when Blackmun, only
five months from his retirement, staked out a new position on death penalty
cases. In the most quoted line from the opinion - "From this day forward, I
no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death"22 - Blackmun used
metaphor to evoke the Justices as casual mechanics indifferent to the human
dimension of such 'tnkering" with an imperfect machine. Even more striking
than the metaphor is the directness of its resolution, the shift in focus from the
future of the defendant to the future of the author. The first appearance of the
pronoun "I" signals a self-dramatizing turn in the opinion that reaches its
climax in the extraordinary conclusion, in which Blackmun expressed his
hope that the Court eventually would adopt his position: "I may not live to see
217. Id. at 212 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
218. Philippa Strum, Change and Continuity on the Supreme Court: Conversations with
Justice Harry A. Blackmun, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 285, 297 (2000). Blackmun conceded that "I
probably agonize over cases more than I should, and more than most of my colleagues do." Id.
at 300.
219. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141,1143 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
220. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 1145 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting).
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that day, but I have faith that eventually it will arrive. "2 The dissent that
opened by invoking the certain death of the defendant closes by invoking the
less imminent but equally certain death of the author, who now replaces
Callins as the emotional center of the opinion.
Blackmun was most likely to position himself center stage when defend-
ing his signature opinion, Roe v. Wade, from the increasing threats of reversal
by the Rehnquist Court. In Websterv. Reproductive Health Services,2fl Black-
mun dissented from a Court resolution that, although leaving Roe intact,
seemed to invite further challenges to abortion rights.224 His opinion includes
a somber prophecy: "I fear for the future. I fear for the liberty and equality
of the millions of women who have lived and come of age in the 16 years
since Roe was decided. I fear for the integrity of, and public esteem for, this
Court."225 The three sentences, each beginning with "I," express concern for
women and for the Court itself, but the rhetorical effect of the repeated
pronoun is instead to insist on Blackmun as the protagonist, the author who
is personally threatened by the reversal of Roe. The close association of
Blackmun with Roe - he predicted, accurately, that it would follow him to his
grave22 - makes the threat to overturn it a personal assault on him.
This tendency to shift the focus to himself reached its apotheosis in Casey,
where Blackmun saw Roe's survival as measured by "but a single vote"' '
separating the world of abortion rights from the world of prohibition. His
opinion ends with the most remarkable instance of self-revelation in the Court's
history: "I am 83 years old. I cannot remain on this Court forever, and when
I do step down, the confirmation process for my successor well may focus on
the issue before us today. That, I regret, may be exactly where the choice
between the two worlds will be made."' By disclosing his age, Blackmun
222. Id. at 1159 (Blackmun, j., dissenting).
223. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
224. Webster v. Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490,537 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring
and dissenting).
225. Id. at 538 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
226. BlacbnunAcceptsAfermath of WritingAbortion Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18,1983.
Blackmun's prediction proved correct when his obituaries led with his role as the author ofRoe.
See Linda Greenhouse, Justice Blaclanun, Author ofAbortion Rights, Dies: Onetime Conserva-
tive, 90, Shifted on Court to Hardy Liberal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1999. Radhika Rano, a former
law clerk, notes in this context that "[at times, Justice Blackmun seemed to regret his close
connection with Roe" but that he "also appeared to identify himself with this decision, as is evi-
dent in the unusually personal and passionate tone of his dissents in cases where he felt the
abortion right to be under assault." Radhika Rao, The Author ofRoe, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
21,22 (1998).
227. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 943 (1992)
(Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
228. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
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violated the Court convention ofjudicial impersonality in a way that no earlier
Justice, not even Douglas, had attempted. He identified himself not simply as
a Justice but as an elderly man who saw his tenure on the Court coming to an
end. Even more striking, Blackmun's reference to his own advanced age and
imminent departure introduced into the text the idea of judicial succession and
of the political maneuvering that has characterized the appointment process in
recent years. It has long been conventional for the Court to speak of itself as a
continuing entity undisturbed by changes in personnel; thus, a 1999 opinion
may note that "we" ruled in 1899 on a certain point in a certain way.
Blackmun's opinion undermined this fiction of continuity and replaced it with
the stark reality of an institution that is altered by the identity of the men and
women who occupy its seats. The reference to the way in which his successor
would likely be chosen - based on firmly held positions - also insists that the
decisionmaking model of neutral principles and detached Justices is another
polite legal fiction. The reality, Blackmun asserted, is that his successor would
be chosen by political actors for essentially political reasons. Blackmun
presented himself as the besieged defender of the faith, weakened by age and
surrounded by the hostile forces of the opposition, both on and off the Court.
Far from a member of a collegial institution that operates on principles of
professionalism and continuity, Blackmun spoke as an outsider, a Justice who
was at the same time both part of, and alienated from, the Court. It is an ex-
traordinary rhetorical performance, one that exposes not simply the Justice
beneath the robe but the transitory nature of his power and the political process
that will inevitably replace him.
IV Conclusion
As the Roosevelt Court voices demonstrate, judicial neutrality does not
require impersonality. The distinctive styles of the Roosevelt Court Justices
communicate the force of judicial personality without suggesting that emotion
has overwhelmed reason or principle as the basis for decisionmaking. When
those Justices resorted to personal disclosures, whether of professional or
personal identity, they did so in a manner that tended to reinforce rather than
diminish the neutrality principle. Despite their pasts, they indicated that they
sat as members of the Court, rather than as particular individuals who might
have permitted their private emotions to control their professional conduct.
Whether written with the formality of Frankfurter, the simplicity of Black, the
elegance of Jackson, or even the solipsism of Douglas, their opinions convey
a recognizable personality restrained in the service of the judicial role.
The voices of the Rehnquist Court send a different message, expressing
personal emotion rather than judicial personality. The opinions of Kennedy,
Rehnquist, and Blackmun employ a variety of rhetorical strategies to justify
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a position or persuade a reader that the majority has erred, but these strategies
work by channeling powerful emotions rather than communicating a sense of
coherent judicial personality. Even Scalia, whose distinctive style comes
closest to the approach of the Roosevelt Court Justices, works in opinions like
Casey to engage the reader in his rhetoric of indignation. It is, however, the
opinions of Justice Blackmun that illustrate most clearly the risk of allowing
emotion to overwhelm the constraints of the judicial role. When, in Casey,
he introduced into the text of his opinion the specter of his own imminent
departure from the Court, Blackmun undermined the identity of the Court as
an ageless institution whose individual members, although always changing,
remain constant in their commitment to neutral principles of law and justice.
As Justice Cardozo cautioned, there is no way to extinguish the personal
identity of a judge and leave behind only a dispassionate professional deci-
sionmaker. The challenge for strongminded judges, especially those assigned
the extraordinary powers of Supreme Court Justices, is to harness personal
identity in the service of judicial neutrality. Two generations ago the Roose-
velt Court Justices found a way to transform their individual identities into
judicial personalities that expressed coherent legal visions without sacrificing
neutrality to emotion. In an era of splintered opinions and multiple law clerks,
the Rehnquist Court Justices are still struggling to meet that challenge.
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